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THE INDIANA JUDGMENT LIEN LAW OF 1929
By THOMAS J. HURLEY -
The General Assembly at its 76th session (Acts of 1929,
Ch. 83, p. 278; Burns Supplement 1929, No. 634 and No. 659;
Burns 1933 No. 2-2520 and No. 2-2706) amended the judg-
ment lien law, Acts of 1881, special session, p. 240, No. 587
and No. 601 (Burns 1926, No. 634 and No. 659).
In addition it repealed Acts of 1881, p. 240, No. 603
(Burns 1926, No. 662) and Acts of 1893, p. 43, Nos. 1, 2
and 3 (Burns 1926, Nos. 664, 665 and 666).
Further it expressly repealed -"all laws in conflict", which
likely includes Acts of 1881, special session, p. 240, No. 604
(Burns 1926, No. 663) and perhaps others.
The first section requires the clerk of the Circuit Court of
each county to keep a judgment docket in which he shall enter
and index alphabetically a statement or transcript of any judg-
ment for the recovery of money when such statement or tran-
script shall have. been filed in his office; such statement shall
show, (1) the names of all the parties, the name of the court,
the number of the cause, the book and page wherein the
judgment is recorded (Order Book?) and the date of the
judgment; (2) the amount of the judgment and the amount
of the costs; (3) and if the judgment be against several
persons, the statement shall be repeated under the name of
each judgment debtor in alphabetical order. It further pro-
vides that any person interested in any judgment for money
or costs rendered by any court of general original jurisdiction,
STATE OR FEDERJL, sitting in the State of Indiana, may
file in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of any county
in this state, a statement thereof, setting forth the above facts,
or a transcript of said judgment, duly certified, in either case,
under the hand and seal of the court rendering the judgment;
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and the Clerk shall forthwith enter the same on the Judgment
Docket.
The second section provides that all final judgments for
the recovery of money or costs in the Circuit Court and other
courts of record of general original jurisdiction sitting in the
State of Indiana, WHETHER STATE OR FEDERAL,
shall be a lien upon real estate and chattels real liable to
execution in the county where, AND ONLY WHERE such
judgment has been duly entered and indexed in the Judgment
Docket as provided by law, from and after the time the same
shall have been so entered and indexed and until the expiration
of ten years from the rendition thereof, and no longer, exclu-
sive of the time during which the party may be restrained
from proceeding thereon by any appeal or injunction or by
the death of the defendant, or by agreement of the parties
entered of record.
The third section repeals all laws in conflict and particularly
No. 603 of the Acts of 1881, p. 240 (Burns 1926, No. 662),
and Acts of 1893, p. 43, (Burns 1926, Nos. 664, 665 and
666).
The fourth section declares an emergency and makes the
act in full force and effect from its passage. It was approved
March 11, 1929.
It is at once apparent, since there is no saving clause, that
this Act destroyed the lien upon real estate of all judgments
rendered prior to its effective date and gives the ones interested
in all prior and subsequent judgments, either state or federal,
in lieu thereof, the privilege of making them liens by complying
with its requirements.
In the second section the words "as provided by law"
apparently mean, "as in Section 1 provided" or "as shall be
later provided by law".
A question may be raised as to the power of the Legislature
to divest or destroy the liens existing by virtue of the statute
prior to this amendment, and to impose upon the persons
interested the requirement of filing statements or transcripts
and redocketing, in order to restore their liens. A judgment
under the amended statute, or under the former statute, was
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not a specific, but only a general lien; and the Legislature has
the right to make, modify or remove it at pleasure.'
At least the Legislature may do so at any time before rights
under the judgment have become vested. It probably cannot
be successfully contended that a judgment lien-holder under
the statute, from that fact alone, has a vested right the removal
of which by the Legislature invades his constitutional preroga-
tives. The definition of vested rights as given at Vol. 12
Corpus Juris, p. 995, No. 485, is as follows:
"Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, prior or prospective,
has become the property of some particular person as a present interest.
On the other hand, a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent
interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws,
does not constitute a vested right." See Donaldson v. State, 167 Ind.
553; 67 N. E. 1029; 78 N. E. 182. (1906).
The Act apparently does not affect the lien of the levy of
an execution upon real estate, within the statutory requirements
*ts to first levying upon personal property and as to the time
limit of such lien, which is six (6) months, and which is
expressly discharged at the end of that time (Burns' 1926,
No. 826; 1933, No. 2-3914).
When we discover the causes and reasons underlying this
change in our judgment lien law the application of the amended
statute and its interpretation become clarified.
The U. S. Congress in 1881 passed an Act to the effect
that judgments and decrees of the Federal District Courts
within any state should be liens throughout such state in the
same manner and to the same extent, and under the same
conditions only, as if such judgments and decrees had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction of such state;
and whenever the law of any state requires a judgment of a
State Court to be recorded or docketed or other thing to be
done before the lien shall attach, the Act shall be applicable
only when the laws of such state shall authorize Federal judg-
1 Gimble v. Stolte, 59 Ind. 446 (1877); Quackenbush v. Taylor, Adm., 86
Ind. 270 (1882); Snyder v. Thieme and Wagner Brewing Co., et al., 173
Ind. 667, 90 N. E. 314 (1910).
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ments to be docketed, or otherwise conformed to the rules
and requirements relating to judgments of the state courts;
and that federal judgment shall cease to be liens at like periods
as state judgments. 2
So unless a state shall pass laws requiring or permitting
Federal judgments rendered within that state to be recorded
in the County where the lands of the judgment debtor is
located, under precisely the same terms and conditions as the
State Judgments, the Federal Judgments continue to constitute
liens throughout the entire state.
The desirability of having Federal judgment-liens confined
to the county where the land of the judgment debtor is
situated, is apparent. In 1893 the Indiana Legislature passed
an Act to the effect that any person interested might file in the
office of the Clerk of any Circuit Court, a copy of any Federal
Judgment rendered in the District of Indiana, certified by the
Clerk; arid when so filed, the Clerk of the Circuit Court should
enter the same in the Order Book and Judgment Docket the
same as state judgments; and providing further that such
judgment, from the time of filing, should be a lien upon the
real estate of the judgment debtor in the county as though
such judgment had been rendered therein..
It further provided that the Clerk of the Circuit Court
should receive the same fee as for entering judgments rendered
in the state courts. The validity of that Act was never
questioned with the view it imposed a burden upon Federal
Judgments not shared by those of the State.3
The State of Missouri several years ago, enacted a similar
law. This was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri in
1925 as not placing burdens upon Federal Judgments which
were not shared by the State judgment in the case of Rhea
v. Smith, 308 Mo. 422; 272 S. W. 964. On certiorari from
the U. S. Supreme Court, it was held that the Missouristatute
was invalid as to Federal Judgments, because the State judg-
ment-holder was not required to obtain, pay for and file a
2 Acts of Congress 1881, Ch. 729 25 St. at L. 357, U. S. Code Title 28,
No. 812, U. S. Comp. Stat. No. 1606.
3 Acts of 1893, p. 43 Burns 1926, Nos. 664, 665 and 666.
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transcript of his judgment so that it might constitute a lien;
while such a requirement was imposed upon the holder of a
Federal Judgment. 4
The opinion was written by Chief Justice William Howard
Taft and among other things he said:
"We are dealing here with a question necessarily of great nicety in
determining the effect and priority of liens upon real estate; and the
subject requires exactness. Merely approximate conformity with refer-
ence to such a subject will not do especially where complete conformity
is possible".
The court observes that the Supreme Court of Missouri held
that, as to time, the Federal Judgment holder would not be
prejudiced by delay in filing his transcript because the lien
attaches from the time of the rendition of the judgment.
Judge Taft replies:
"The risk is in the danger that the judgment creditors attorney may
neglect to file the transcript, the State judgment holder having a lien
without being required to even remember that a transcript should be
filed"'
By analogy it seems clear that the Indiana Act of 1893 was
subject to the same infirmity as the Missouri statute and con-
sequently was void. It may be observed that the Act of
Congress does not prohibit the State Legislature from impos-
ing a burden upon Federal Judgments so long as State judg-
ments are required to share an equal load, i. e. pay a uniform
fee for marking the transcript or statement and for the record-
ing thereof; or, if no fee is chargeable for either then the
duty of procuring and filing such transcript or statement.
It is assumed that the judgment docket of the Circuit Court
is the same as that of the Superior Court, in view of Burns
Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, No. 4-1113 (1480), at least so far as
Lake County is concerned, and I believe all the other Superior
Courts of the State. I find no authority for a separate judg-
ment docket for Superior Courts.
4 Rhea v. Smith (1927), 274 U. S. 434; 47 Sup. Ct. 698; 71 U. S. L. ed. 139.
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